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The Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe () became
involved in the Republic of Moldova at a
time of much instability. This article
analyses the organisation’s multidimen-
sional response to the problems in the
country, especially efforts to achieve a
political settlement to the conflict between
the central authorities in Chisinau and
the Transdniestrian secessionists. In
addition, it pays particular attention to
the role of the other official mediators,
Russia and Ukraine, the significance of
the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Moldovan territory, and the promotion
of reforms and democratisation. While
assessing the  field mission as an
instrument for crisis management, the
paper underscores the need to view 
activities in Moldova in a comprehensive
way. So far, attempts to find a political
settlement have proven unsuccessful,
although developments in human rights,
democratisation and military reform,
for instance, may enhance confidence
and build trust between the parties—
becoming fundamental pillars of a future
agreement. Nevertheless, the prospects
are not bright, and a political solution
will require further commitment from
external actors like Russia and Ukraine.
Maria Raquel Sousa Freire is an assistant professor,
Department of International Relations, Universidade
Lusíada do Porto, Portugal. Her research focuses on
the former Soviet space and the role of international
organisations in conflict and security issues.
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70 Introduction
The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to establish a peaceful Europe in
which the values of democracy and co-operation would prevail—a vision set out by
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe ()1 in its 1990 Charter
of Paris.2 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, new states
emerged and new understandings of security took shape, adding a socio-economic
and cultural dimension to the traditional concept of politico-military security. At the
same time, international organisations that focused on European security matters
had to reformulate and adapt to the changed circumstances. The  was not an
exception.
Instead of withering away in the post-Cold War environment (as some observers
expected), the  enlarged, took on new tasks and adopted a more dynamic app-
roach to the problems in its area. The Charter of Paris set a fresh course for the
organisation, devising new principles and creating permanent institutions, which
have since been refined on the basis of needs and experience. Specialised bodies,
such as the Forum for Security Co-operation (), the Office for Democratic Insti-
tutions and Human Rights (), the High Commissioner on National Minorities
() and the Representative on Freedom of the Media, were set up. New docu-
ments, including the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security,3
were signed. Regular meetings and assessment exercises have allowed activities to
be co-ordinated and the implementation of  commitments by participating
states to be evaluated.4
New tasks in the areas of preventive diplomacy, crisis management and post-con-
flict rehabilitation, complementing action in the human, politico-military and
economic spheres, have defined the organisation’s post-Cold War agenda. The
broad and integrated approaches developed by the organisation reflect the close
linkages between all aspects of  activity. In this way, the  aims to play a
part in raising awareness and building confidence. Nevertheless, the ideals for which
it stands—a united and peaceful Europe with common values and shared prin-
ciples—are still far from being realised. Within the newly independent republics
of the former Soviet Union, for instance, economic, social, political and/or historical
factors have contributed to an atmosphere of tension and have led to armed conflict
in certain cases. Different political, economic, social, cultural and ethnic features
shape the ’s view of conflict situations—reflected in the mandates and actions
of its field missions. The functions of these deployments vary according to needs on
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the ground, although, in general, they all combine human rights, politics and econ-
omics (and military elements when applicable), including the provision of technical
advice and assistance to the host country.
The  is essentially playing a crisis-management role in the Republic of Mol-
dova, involving the dispatch of good offices and the utilisation of mediation instru-
ments—rather than enforcement mechanisms, such as sanctions or embargoes, or
the use of force. As a mediator, the  prepares and discusses proposals, suggests
alternatives, and encourages and helps the parties to find a political solution to
their problems. The organisation decided on 4 February 1993 to establish a long-
term mission to Moldova to facilitate ‘a lasting political settlement, on the basis of
 principles and commitments, of the conflict in the left bank Dniester area of
the Republic of Moldova’.5 Two assignments are central to the mandate of the
mission. First, it is to assist the parties in pursuing negotiations on a lasting political
agreement, consolidating the independence and sovereignty of Moldova along with
understanding about a special status for the breakaway region of Transdniestria.
Second, it is to encourage the parties to pursue negotiations on the status and with-
drawal of foreign troops. Additionally, the mandate allows the mission to gather
information and to provide expertise in relation to, and advice on, the military
situation, human and minority rights and the process of democratic transformation.
The mission opened an office in the Moldovan capital of Chisinau on 25 April 1993,6
and a branch office was set up in the capital of Transdniestria, Tiraspol, on 13 Febru-
ary 1995, in accordance with an Understanding on the Act of the  Mission in the
Pridnestrovskaia Region of the Republic of Moldova.7
Background to the conflict
The Republic of Moldova, a territory of some 33,700 square kilometres, borders
Ukraine in the north, south and east, and Romania in the west. The region between
the Prut and Dniester Rivers was historically called Bessarabia (now the Republic of
Moldova) and was annexed by the Russian Empire in 1812. After Russia’s defeat in
the 1854–56 Crimean War, Romania recovered the southern part of Bessarabia under
the Paris Treaty of 30 March 1856. However, the territory was returned to Russia at
the month-long Congress of Berlin in summer 1878. After a period under Tsarist
control, Bessarabia was handed back to Romania in accordance with the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk signed between Russia and the central powers on 3 March 1918.
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bank of the Dniester River the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia.
On 28 June 1940, following the signing of the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, the
Soviet Union demanded that Romania relinquish the regions of Bessarabia and
northern Bukovina—territories that had been occupied by Soviet troops. In August,
the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia was joined with the part of
Bessarabia that had been annexed from Romania, becoming known on 2 August
1940 as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldavia. In July 1941, the Soviet Union again
lost Moldavia to Romania (supported by German troops), excluding the area on the
left bank of the Dniester River. Soviet control was re-established in August 1944,
after its forces entered Romania and occupied Bucharest—where a communist
government was installed. The left bank area of the Dniester was thus never under
Romanian control.
The present borders of Moldova were set in 1947 with the formation of a new Mol-
davian Soviet Socialist Republic and the formal ceding of the area from Romania to
the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947. From that time,
socialist policies were implemented in the territory, including the promotion of
Russian and Ukrainian immigration, particularly to the industrial centres, and the
imposition of Cyrillic script. As a result, Soviet power was institutionalised through-
out the territory.8
By the late 1980s, political groups aiming to achieve national independence ex-
tended their influence in many of the former Soviet republics. In the Republic of
Moldova, the Popular Front of Moldavia sought the re-introduction of Latin script
in place of the Cyrillic alphabet, the adoption of Romanian as the state language and
the introduction of a new tricolour flag (like that of Romania), with the goal of de-
fending the nationalist cause and breaking with Moscow. Reflecting these objectives,
the Constitution of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic was modified on 30
August 1989, making Moldavian the official state language (written in Latin script)
and Russian the inter-ethnic language of communication. These amendments
demanded that employees of the state administration and the holders of public
office have a ‘necessary level’ of knowledge of Moldavian and Russian—and Gagauz
in areas with a Gagauz population9—in order to fulfil their obligations.10 What a
‘necessary level’ meant was unclear, generating anxiety among those who did not
speak the Moldavian language.11 At that time, almost every Moldavian speaker knew
Russian, but not many Russian speakers knew Moldavian. Combined with the
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strengthening of the Popular Front, these developments crystallised Transdniestrian
fears regarding Moldavian unification with Romania.
Consequently, Transdniestria, which wanted closer ties with the Soviet Union,
declared independence from the Republic of Moldova on 2 September 1990. Three
months later, the Second Extraordinary Session of People’s Deputies of the Dniester
Area announced the establishment of the Moldovan Transdniestrian Republic,
Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Republika (), following a referendum in which
97.7% voted for autonomy12—the central government did not recognise the state-
ment. The laws of the Republic of Moldova were considered invalid in Transdniestria,
and the secessionists sought to take control of the local-government institutions
that were still under the authority of Chisinau.
Meanwhile, Moldova had declared itself an autonomous republic on 23 June 1990,
proclaiming the 1940 annexation by the Soviet Union illegal and reaffirming the
supremacy of its constitution and national legislation. Formal independence was
achieved on 27 August 1991. After years of authoritarian rule and operating in
accordance with a centralised economy, the Republic of Moldova committed itself
to developing democratic structures based on the rule of law and to asserting its
sovereignty. On 8 December 1991, Mircea Snegur was elected the first president of
Moldova with the support of the Popular Front. Nevertheless, the demand for unifi-
cation with Romania lost strength after the formation of a government of national
unity in July 1992, as the consolidation of independence became the preferred strat-
egy. Opinion polls organised in 1992 and 1993 and a referendum in 1994 revealed
that, in fact, few people advocated unification.13 The primary goals became forging a
new state and joining the community of European democratic states, particularly in
view of Transdniestrian separatism.
Eruption of armed conflict
Moldova’s post-independence political agenda heightened concern among Russian
speakers, especially those settled on the left bank of the Dniester River. They feared
the introduction of political and economic reforms that would extinguish the social-
ist way of life. As noted above, Transdniestria had never been under Romanian
control and its past was marked by Slavic influence. Moreover, Transdniestria, the
most industrialised part of Moldova, held a strong strategic position in relation to
the communications network and access to external markets. The region accounts
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inhabitants14), yet it generates 35% of the republic’s national income.15 As such, the
majority of the Transdniestrian industrial élite was concerned about the potential loss
of privileges and of socio-political prestige.
While Moldova committed itself to democratic principles and to the reformation
of the old system, Transdniestria remained loyal to Soviet rule. Such positions
necessitated a division of power in the country. Not having the mechanisms to allow
such a transformation to occur through peaceful and democratic means, however,
conflict became inevitable.
Armed confrontation between Moldovan and Transdniestrian forces finally erupted
in March 1992. The Transdniestrian leadership, led by Igor Smirnov, set up para-
military structures and took control of the official institutions on the left bank.
Chisinau tried to regain control of them through coercion, but Tiraspol responded
by eliminating all law-enforcement organs still loyal to the Republic of Moldova.
The latter’s poorly equipped police and ill-trained army were easily overcome by
 troops, which received hardware, support and instruction from the Russian
14th Army, stationed in Transdniestria.16 After four months of intense fighting,
Moldovan forces had to accept both their inferiority and Russian conditions for an
end to the violence.
On 21 July 1992, Moldova and Russia signed an agreement in Moscow on the Prin-
ciples of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in Transdniestria. The accord
established a ceasefire, defined a security zone along the Dniester River, demanded
that human rights be respected, and provided for the deployment of a tripartite
(Russian, Moldovan and Transdniestrian) peacekeeping force.17 This was under the
supervision of the Trilateral Joint Military Command, subordinated to the Joint
Control Commission ()—set up in July 1992 with its headquarters in Bendery,
Transdniestria. The functions of the  include controlling the security zone, pre-
venting violent incidents, and ensuring implementation of decisions regarding
withdrawal and demilitarisation. In the event of a violation of the agreement on the
Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in Transdniestria, the  is
responsible for taking appropriate measures to restore law and order.18 In addition,
the Russian 14th Army was to be neutral and negotiations were to take place on its
status and on a timetable for withdrawal. The principles set forth in the agreement
include respect for the Republic of Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,
and the need to establish a special status for the left bank.
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Evolution of the two banks
Since the signing of the agreement, Moldova and Transdniestria have evolved
discretely, with separate economic, social, ideological, political and educational
systems. The left bank maintains remnants of the Soviet system, has limited mech-
anisms to support a market economy, favours state ownership, and is oriented
towards Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (). Despite its
unrecognised status, the  has its own president, government and all the insti-
tutions of a functioning state (judicial, administrative and executive organs).
Hardly any economic reconstruction has occurred in Transdniestria in the past ten
years. The left bank is dependent on Russia for raw materials and as a market for its
produce. The search for new outlets has not been successful, as Transdniestrian
goods are unable to compete in the Western marketplace. Furthermore, the left bank
does not receive any international assistance (because of its unrecognised status). ‘In
contrast to Moldova’s capital, Chisinau, there are few billboards to be seen in
Tiraspol: no hint of Pepsi or Playboy capitalism, instead there are ration cards for
subsidised bread’.19
Yet the  has a well-organised military–industrial complex, including enter-
prises that manufacture armaments and factories that repair military equipment.
Some 50,000 weapons and 40,000 tons of shells, rockets and bombs are produced
and sold, constituting an important source of revenue.20 Moreover, the Transdnies-
trian leadership regularly pays salaries and pensions that are slightly above those
offered in the Republic of Moldova, guaranteeing the population’s loyalty to the
separatist administration.
The right bank, meanwhile, has adhered to free-market economics, privatisation,
and democratic and Western principles. Nonetheless, Moldova is mainly an agri-
cultural-based country and is highly dependent on Russia for energy and raw
materials, as well as on markets in the  (of which Moldova is a member). The
republic suffered a recession from 1992 until 1996 and economic recovery has been
slow. It benefits from international assistance, particularly through agreements
negotiated with the International Monetary Fund () and the World Bank. How-
ever, these institutions have suspended loans on several occasions due to the
unstable situation and Moldova’s inability to comply with their demands.
Moldova is now ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world.21 The gulf
between rich and poor is increasingly evident—only a few individuals engaged in
parallel activities and shady business dealings have become prosperous. Corruption
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standing of free-market economics, do not contribute to a positive assessment.
According to Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin: ‘The word “law” has become
synonymous with “corruption”, the word “reform”—with “stagnation”, “poverty”
and “trouble”’.22
A tortuous negotiating process
Negotiations to find a lasting political settlement to the dispute have proceeded
very slowly and have suffered many interruptions—reconciliation efforts have been
hampered by mistrust, mutual accusations and uncompromising unilateral initia-
tives. A number of complex factors contribute to the intricate situation in Moldova,
including the different political, economic and social orientations of the parties, the
status of Transdniestria, the division of responsibilities between Tiraspol and Chisi-
nau, the existence of large quantities of armaments and the presence of the Russian
14th Army. General consensus has been reached on the form of the accord, but not
on the content. The belligerents have constantly committed themselves to dialogue
and to further contact and concur that a solution must be found through peaceful
means. Yet different interpretations of concepts and agreements have stifled the talks.
The status of Transdniestria remains the fundamental obstacle to a final settle-
ment. Chisinau has agreed to grant autonomous status and wide powers to the ,
but the Moldovan authorities are adverse to the idea of establishing a confederation,
owing to the size of the territory and to the fact that it would be set up on a terri-
torial basis, since there are no ethnic or cultural claims to the region. Transdniestria,
however, believes that autonomy should be awarded via an ‘inter-governmental’
agreement between Chisinau and Tiraspol. A confederate solution would make the
left bank a sovereign state, with parallel powers to those of Moldova. While the 
does not intend to give up the powers that it has achieved to date, equalling those of
a state, Moldova rejects the granting of fundamental powers to the left bank, inclu-
ding responsibility for security, defence and financial policy, since it does not recog-
nise Transdniestria as a legal entity.
Another key issue is the extraction of Russian troops and equipment from Moldova.
This has long been a source of disagreement between Chisinau and Tiraspol, and
between Moldova and Russia. Chisinau sees the stationing of some 2,500 Russian
troops and equipment on its territory as illegal occupation by a foreign force, a direct
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challenge to national unity (given the help provided by the 14th Army to the separa-
tists), and as interference in its internal affairs, representing a continuing threat to its
independence.23 On the left bank, by contrast, Russian forces are perceived to be
offering military, political and moral support—besides guaranteeing the separate
status of Transdniestria, or at least providing a protective umbrella. The  believes
that the withdrawal of Russian troops would amount to ‘a genuine betrayal of
Russia’s interests’,24 and thus has little incentive to reach an agreement.25 Trans-
dniestria claims ownership of the equipment and ammunition and has been trying
to prevent its removal by requiring that any peace deal provide it with a status akin
to that of a separate state. The Moldovan authorities have repeatedly accused Trans-
dniestria of uncooperative behaviour by refusing to accept military inspections, by
engaging in illegal practices, and by devising numerous obstacles to the demilitar-
isation of the security zone.26
Moldova has asked for greater commitment from the Russian Federation on the
withdrawal issue, stating that its passive attitude prevents real progress. The use of
phrases like ‘to postpone’, ‘to take notice of ’ or ‘to continue studying’ does not
provide the level of (Russian) assurance that Moldova would like to see.27 Russia has
linked the pulling out of the 14th Army from Transdniestria with a political settle-
ment to the dispute. The aim of such a synchronised procedure is to eradicate fears
on the left bank about a return to violence and to restore confidence. Russia has
stressed that political, technical and social issues make the withdrawal difficult,
particularly the transportation of equipment through Ukraine and the construction
of houses for returned military personnel.
According to  data, the size of the existing arsenal far exceeds the needs of the
Russian contingent in the region. There is around 20 tons of military equipment for
every Russian soldier in the , a ratio described by the Deputy Chief of the
 mission, General Roman Hormoza, as ‘unmatched in any other military
contingent in the world’.28 At the  Summit in Istanbul, Turkey, in November
1999, the organisation welcomed Russia’s commitment to withdraw by the end of
2002, which it reaffirmed at the 17 July 2000 special session of the  Permanent
Council. The  reiterated that an international assessment mission was ready
to be dispatched to Moldova to ensure transparency in the demilitarisation of the
security zone.29
Moldovan senior government sources point out that the absence of weapons and
military personnel would facilitate negotiations—a view shared by the  mission
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including non-compliance with signed agreements and obstruction of on-site in-
spections, there has been some advancement. The Transdniestrian authorities, for
example, have agreed, in principle, to grant observer access to their military bases in
the security zone. International donors, such as France, Germany, Hungary, Nether-
lands, Poland, Romania, Sweden and the , have offered expertise and technical
assistance in regard to the destruction of matériel, and the  has set up a fund to
help the parties remove, destroy or adapt for industrial use their ammunition and
equipment. The process may be accelerated by the fact that it could be an important
source of income for Russia—its stockpile in the left bank is worth some $8 billion.30
However, the commitment and goodwill of the parties remain fundamental. Forces
on both sides are interested in maintaining the status quo. There are groups in the
Republic of Moldova and on the left bank that reap economic and political benefits
from the dispute, particularly as a result of illegal pursuits, including the smuggling
of drugs, tobacco and weapons. These groups have substantial economic power, and
thus wield considerable influence in relation to the peace process.31
Time is working against a political settlement. The protracted nature of the negotia-
tions has allowed two distinct positions within the same country to develop and to
take root. A political solution, therefore, must make provision for the very different
views of Moldova and Transdniestria. (This has proved a difficult task for the expert
groups and the mediators.) Many observers saw the 2001 parliamentary and presi-
dential elections in Moldova as possibly offering a new opportunity for conflict
resolution in the country. In general, the communist-oriented policies of the new
government, its desire to integrate into the Russia–Belarus union and the increased
importance attached to the Russian language could have forged a closer relationship
between the left and right banks. Despite an initially positive reception, though, the
 leadership has distanced itself from the proposals presented by the Republic of
Moldova, such as for new customs and tax stamps, and has refused to attend sche-
duled meetings with Voronin. Otherwise, ‘the myth of Transdniestria as a fortress
under siege would have crumbled’,32 leading to a gradual erosion of the regime.
The involvement of external states
Russia, Ukraine and the  mission are the three official mediators in the
negotiations. They work together on documents and recommendations, participate
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in meetings and jointly sign agreements. Their presence prevents proposals being
put forward that contradict international norms or that may create tensions with
other countries. Yet this generally co-operative approach has not proved sufficiently
cohesive to influence the talks.
Notably, Romania (a neighbouring country) has not assumed the role of an official
mediator. In early 1992, Romania participated with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova—
the Quadripartite Commission—in attempts to mollify the growing hostility
between Moldova and Transdniestria. These efforts included the adoption of a
declaration defining a set of principles for a peaceful political solution, for the dis-
armament of irregular forces and for establishing a neutral status for the Russian
14th Army. With an increase in violence in June 1992, however, the Quadripartite
Commission became inactive. In addition, the appeal for unification with Romania
lost strength in Moldova, as demonstrated by statements regarding ‘two independent
states and one common culture’,33 prompting Romania to distance itself from the
diplomatic initiative.
Relations between Moldova and Romania have since improved with the signing of
bilateral political and economic agreements. And Romania’s desire to integrate into
the European Union () has led to it becoming more involved in the quest for a
solution to the Moldova–Transdniestria affair. Romania’s key concerns relate to
the effective withdrawal of military equipment from the left bank, and to the possible
integration of Moldova into the Russia–Belarus union.34
For Russia, Ukraine and the , the solution to the conflict must encompass
broad autonomous status for the region and some form of power sharing that is
acceptable to both sides. Ukraine is in favour of restoring a unified socio-economic
space and all ties between the left and right banks, which should be done according
to the staggered terms of a peace deal and timetable for implementation.35 This
gradual approach envisages reaching agreement on the less problematic issues (like
social-policy questions) before the more delicate matters (such as security and
defence and the status of Transdniestria) are tackled, with the aim of generating
confidence and an atmosphere conducive to constructive dialogue. Decisions made
by the parties should be implemented progressively, allowing structures and insti-
tutions to be adapted on both sides. Ukraine has a direct interest in the stabilisation
of the situation, since shipments of Russian military equipment flow, and illegal
activities (trafficking of drugs and armaments, for instance) take place, across its
border with the . While officially committed to an early resolution of the con-
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flict, including the deployment of military observers in the security zone, Ukraine
has welcomed Smirnov as an official visitor to the country and has shown interest in
the industrial potential of the left bank.36 Hence, it has adopted a soft posture during
the negotiations.
Meanwhile, Russia has proved to be an inconsistent player in the peace process. It
maintains links with the  and has demonstrated public support for the left-bank
leadership on several occasions, but it continues to support the territorial integrity
of Moldova. Such a contradictory position calls into question its role in the negotia-
tions. Russia was accused of partiality during the armed confrontation of March–
June 1992, openly backing the secessionists.37 Chisinau claimed that Russia’s stance
goes against international regulations and the official commitment made by the
Russian Federation in 1994 regarding the territorial integrity of Moldova.38 The
fragile relationship between these two states is compounded by Moldovan references
to the ‘occupying army’, representing a ‘permanent source of conflict and a perpetual
threat to [the] country’s integrity and security’.39 Moscow’s strategy is a twin response
to the demands of those inside Russia who harbour nationalist tendencies and want
to maintain influence in neighbouring countries, and to those who respect the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity given the separatist challenges that Russia faces in places
like Chechnya.40
Although the Russian authorities state that the establishment of order and stability
are their primary goals in the mediation process, pronouncements by the president
are often contradicted by the actions of the parliament—the Duma has even con-
sidered a motion to recognise Transdniestria. In several instances, the Duma has
expressed its support for the independence of the  and has called for stronger
ties between Russia and the breakaway region. The authorities on the left bank, of
course, welcome these comments and appreciate the backing of parliamentary
representatives. The Moldovan government has described such suggestions as ‘un-
friendly’ and a violation of the norms and principles of international law. Further-
more, Moldova interpreted declarations of ‘Transdniestria as primordial Russian
land’ as interference in its internal affairs and as an infringement on its sovereignty
and territorial integrity. Chisinau emphasised, though, that it did not identify the
Duma’s posture with that of the president and the government.
Current Russian efforts to resolve the dispute should not be seen as the result of a
profound shift in domestic policymaking. Russia has not applied any real political
and economic pressure to compel the Transdniestrian leadership to sign a final peace
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agreement. Additionally, issues that might demand more active Russian participation
in the negotiations, such as corruption in the  and the illegal supply of weapons
to Chechnya, do not seem to raise much concern in Moscow. This might be due to
the strategic importance of Transdniestria—it is situated between Russia and
territory acquired through the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (). Russian intervention with the aim of finally settling the con-
flict—via the application of effective political and economic pressure—would prob-
ably only be prompted by a re-escalation of the violence.41
Involvement of the 
The other official mediator, the  mission, has presented some draft documents
and has assisted in establishing the framework for negotiations (it cannot impose
ready-made solutions on the parties), initiating discussions on Transdniestria’s
status based on a territorial autonomy formula.42 Under this framework, it is pro-
posed that the left bank be granted substantial self-rule in the political and cultural
domains, including the creation of a special region with its own executive organisms,
elective assembly and court, and that a single economic, social and legal space—
operating in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity—be set up. Furthermore,
the  mission has stressed that  politicians must be proportionally represented
in Moldova’s parliament and in other key central bodies. In times of stalemate, the
 mission has worked hard to promote understanding and has used diplomacy
to try and persuade the parties to return to the negotiations—if not at the highest
level, then at least at the expert level.
Lack of progress in the talks has hardened Moldova’s view of the mission. For
example, Chisinau has criticised the  mission for its unsuccessful action in
regard to the withdrawal of Russian troops and has demanded that it take a harder
line on separatism.43 Transdniestria, for its part, sees the mission as a vehicle for
internationalising its cause and for creating a link between the parties, for encoura-
ging dialogue and for putting forward proposals.44 Nevertheless, the  has con-
demned what it describes as the pro-Moldovan attitude of the mission—while the
 mission has been increasingly critical of Transdniestria’s lack of co-operation
during the talks.45 As a result, the  mission has been seeking to build confidence
in the peace process. In particular, it appreciates that co-operation on military issues
will enhance stability.
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82 Within the context of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe,46 Voronin (who
is also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces) has initiated a military-reform
programme—to be implemented between 2000 and 2012. According to the Moldo-
van Deputy Minister of Defence, Gheorge Popa, this initiative will build trust in
military policy and reinforce Moldova’s claim that it wants to resolve the dispute by
peaceful means.47 The programme aims to: reduce costs and increase the level of
efficiency and technical training; create a legislative body responsible for framing
the country’s military policy; provide social protection to soldiers and their families;
and encourage collaboration with militaries in other countries. (These measures
complement signed agreements between Moldova and the left-bank leadership on
cuts in the armed forces.) The Moldovan authorities know that the military-reform
project makes a practical contribution to regional stability building, and is in line
with the country’s military pledges to the . Yet implementation of the pro-
gramme is threatened by the socio-economic condition of the republic, especially
the activities of the corrupt élite that receive substantial profits from illegal pursuits.
And the programme does not apply to the , despite many of the problems in
Transdniestria having direct implications for Moldova, such as the illegal produc-
tion, export and circulation of armaments.
Moldova is attempting to control the proliferation of armaments through inspec-
tion regimes and the observation of military activities. The annual exchange of mili-
tary data within the  framework (particularly at the  level) is intended to
guarantee transparency and to foster dialogue between participating states on mili-
tary matters. Transdniestria, however, does not consider itself bound by  deci-
sions, since its leadership did not participate in the negotiation of these documents
—hampering their full implementation in Moldova. The  would like to be treated
as equal to the Republic of Moldova at  meetings—the organisation views the
left bank as an integral part of Moldova.
Meanwhile, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security estab-
lishes principles regarding the role of armed forces in democratic societies and
relations between states in the military field (connecting the politico-military and
human dimensions of  work). In this context, mission members have observed
the withdrawal of some Russian troops and equipment, participated in inspections
of the joint peacekeeping force, and have been pressing for the introduction of
transparency measures, including unfettered access to bases on both banks and
exchanges of military information on numbers of personnel and armoured vehicles.
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(In many instances, however, the Transdniestrian leadership has prevented on-site
inspections or the release of data related to its military contingent and hardware.48)
The aim is to minimise the concerns of the parties in relation to violations of agreed
commitments and the pursuit of illegal activities, particularly in the security zone.
Although Russia has offered assurances at  meetings that it would withdraw
from Transdniestria, the organisation has not been able to exert real pressure on the
country to comply with its promises. When policy decisions or the activities of
 field missions are inconsistent with Russian interests, the country adopts a
non-cooperative stance. Russia does not intend to lose influence in the former Soviet
space, particularly in Moldova. At the same time, though, it desires legitimacy and
Western approval in relation to its actions in neighbouring republics,49 and it needs
and has been benefiting from Western financial and economic assistance.
 As well as the military aspect of  work in Moldova, the human element also
constitutes a critical area of activity. The mission offers advice, particularly on legal
matters, to the Moldovan and Transdniestrian populations and to local representa-
tives, and it provides input on those parts of a potential settlement that concern
international commitments on human and minority rights. This is done through
direct contact with local representatives, the organisation of seminars, or via private
visits to  offices. Abuses relate to the treatment of prisoners and to the general
condition of jails on both sides of the river. Members of the mission regularly visit
these institutions, and have reported instances of torture, poor hygiene, epidemics
and malnutrition. Serious violations have also occurred in regard to the freedom of
the press. The  Representative on Freedom of the Media, Freimut Duve, has
reported extensive control of the media by political parties in Moldova and Trans-
dniestria, as well as lack of funding for serious journalism.50
The organisation of seminars and workshops aims to consolidate civic principles
and to build confidence between the two constituencies. One such gathering resul-
ted in agreement on the local-history textbooks (covering the period of the conflict)
that can be used in Moldovan and Transdniestrian schools.51 The  mission
has also been engaged in a Civic Diplomacy Project—in collaboration with the
, and with the support of the Council of Europe and the . The objective of
the programme is to increase human contact and to foster sustainable dialogue
between civic groups from both sides of the river on matters of common concern. It
also focuses on legislative review and reform, with regard to the provision of assist-
ance to the Commission on the Reform of the Criminal Procedural Code.52
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84 In addition, the  mission has been monitoring developments relating to the
prohibition of the use of Latin script in the , resulting from a decree that dates
back to 9 September 1992. Several schools were closed as a consequence of the
regulation, generating protests from Chisinau and from among the student popula-
tion. A compromise was found in late 1994, when Transdniestria allowed non-state
schools on the left bank to come under Moldovan jurisdiction, and thus to use Latin
script. However, the  authorities have refused to grant licences on administrative
grounds. The  mission, while welcoming the 1994 accord, has described the
Transdniestrian practice of prohibiting the teaching of Moldovan in Latin script as a
violation of human rights.53
Furthermore, the mission, with the backing of the , has been supporting the
work of non-governmental organisations (s). Initiatives include promoting
contacts between s from both banks of the Dniester River, and offering advice
on legal and procedural matters related to the establishment and development of
these organisations. Raising awareness among the population of the potential con-
tribution of s has been an arduous task, since they tend to be close to their
respective government and their goals tend to be highly politicised. Lack of financial
and/or personal resources also constrains their functioning.
The mission has also been involved in monitoring elections and referenda. Accord-
ing to the , these processes have, in general, been free and fair. There have been
minor problems, such as inaccurate voter registers, but these have not been serious
enough to call into question the results. In Transdniestria, however, neither candi-
dates nor voters have been able to participate in polls in an adequate manner, which
the  attributes to lack of information and restrictions imposed by local auth-
orities on freedom of movement. Moreover, none of the elections or referenda on
the left bank has been monitored by the  or another international organisation.54
Despite the efforts of the  mission to encourage democratisation and respect
for fundamental freedoms and human rights, many violations still take place and
need to be addressed. Although the resolution of human issues is not sufficient to
guarantee a final settlement of the dispute, it will contribute to the building of trust.
Crisis management and the  mission
Any assessment of  activity in Moldova must acknowledge the broad mandate
of the mission. Its attempts to overcome the differences between the disputants have
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thus been multidimensional in character, ranging from confidence building and
advising on legislative matters, to the promotion of human rights and the fostering
of dialogue to reinforce a sense of community. This approach reflects the mission’s
view that, when there is deadlock in the political arena, it does not mean that impro-
vements in the human sphere cannot occur.
The  mission has confronted numerous problems in respect to the political
negotiations. It lacks the power of persuasion and is dependent on the political will
of  member states—which include one of the parties to the conflict and the
other two mediators—to adopt any decisions. Consequently, no rigorous schedules
or detailed measures have been agreed. Furthermore, the  has no instruments
to enforce implementation in the event of non-compliance, has a restricted budget
and no military apparatus of its own. The mission has few ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ to
reward or punish the parties. Despite its best efforts to overcome dissension and to
encourage dialogue and confidence, the  mission understands that the answer is
not in its hands. As a mediator, it must combine its negotiation skills with recommen-
dations (not always demonstrating clear commitment) emanating from  head-
quarters in Vienna, Austria, the willingness of the parties to make concessions, and
their desire to make progress in the talks. In sum, a complex web of endogenous and
exogenous factors affects the mediation activities of the  mission.
The same issues apply to the mission’s military mandate. In this sphere, though,
the role of Russia is crucial, not only with regard to the withdrawal of its troops and
equipment from the left bank, but also in relation to the political negotiations. The
Russian Federation wields considerable economic and political influence over the
parties. The , therefore, should remind the country of its obligations to the
organisation. At the same time, the  field mission should continue to implement
its monitoring mandate, vital to the building of confidence between the disputants.
Moreover, the fund established within the  framework to support financially
the extraction of foreign forces counters Russian claims that financial difficulties
prevent it from completing the task. Senior Russian officials, however, continue to
state that some troops should remain in the  to help implement a future agree-
ment on the status of Transdniestria.55
In addition, the mission—which consists of eight members and has a limited bud-
get—requires extra financial support from certain member states (like the Nordic
countries and the ) or other international organisations (such as the ) in order
to implement projects, particularly in the human and socio-economic fields. (Exam-
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Nonetheless, the mission has been able to promote democratisation in the republic,
evidenced, for instance, by the fair-and-free electoral process in Moldova and the
development of the  sector on the left and right banks (primarily in Moldova).
However, Moldova and Transdniestria both have a long way to go before democra-
tisation can be said to have taken root.
The increasing attention devoted to the Moldova–Transdniestria issue in the 
may raise awareness among the organisation’s participating states and eventually
lead to more directed and focused action.56 The involvement of many  mem-
bers57 in the voluntary fund set up to support the withdrawal of Russian troops and
equipment from Moldova illustrates their commitment to finding a political solution
to the conflict. Moreover, the final settlement might be framed in terms of the -led
fight against terrorism, since Transdniestria, neither internationally recognised nor
bound by international norms (in its view), has been accused on several occasions
of unlawfully producing and selling military equipment and of extending support to
illegal groups, including illicit formations operating in Chechnya.58
Despite the lack of progress in the political negotiations, the two sides highlight
accomplishments in terms of their willingness to engage in dialogue, the reduction
in the number of peacekeeping troops and control posts in the security zone,59 the
reconstruction of shared infrastructure, such as bridges linking the two banks
(repaired with  funding), the signature of social and economic agreements, inclu-
ding in the energy sector, co-operation to combat crime, and, above all, the halting
of armed conflict and the maintenance of peace. Such developments indicate that,
although the prospects are still not bright, the parties are moving closer to a poli-
tical agreement.
Conclusion
Events in the Republic of Moldova have proved too intricate to be solved easily. Lack
of democratic experience, the quest for political influence and economic power, and
the presence of foreign troops and armaments play a key part in this protracted dis-
pute. The parties and the mediators believe that, despite the accomplishments noted
above, it could still take a long time to resolve the disagreement. Chisinau regards
the left bank as a subordinate, while Tiraspol sees Moldova and Transdniestria as
equal partners. The current peaceful environment may further institutionalise
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such attitudes, which could lead to increased frustration and extremism on both
sides. The willingness of Moldova and the  to resolve the conflict, despite the
presence of powerful pressure groups, must be clear and they must be prepared to
make concessions. The economic factor may serve as a catalyst for change.
The achievement of a political settlement will not be sufficient to settle all of the
belligerents’ differences and problems, but it is a prerequisite for economic recovery,
including the harmonisation of economic and financial systems, possibly involving
the establishment of a central budget and unified currency. This would help to make
the country attractive to international investors, and could lead to the restructuring
of the social sector (through employment opportunities) and the creation of an equi-
table health and welfare system. Since many of the problems in Moldova and Trans-
dniestria, such as the rise in crime, corruption and the illegal trafficking of human
beings, armaments and drugs, stem from the economic crisis on both banks of the
Dniester River, it is fundamental that the rule of law be strengthened and that an
independent judiciary and democratic institutions and procedures be established.
Moldova has made several amendments to its legislation so that it meets interna-
tional standards and it has signed up to various international conventions, such as
the European Convention on Human Rights, the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, and the European Convention on the Prevention
of Torture.60 However, as stressed above, it still has a long way to go before one can
claim that democratisation has taken hold. Transdniestria, as a non-recognised state,
has not signed up to any such international convention. Moreover, its practices are
based on totally different principles to those of Moldova. If a solution to the conflict
implies integration of the two banks, Moldova and Transdniestria will have to make
profound changes, since they are de facto two parallel states with duplicate struc-
tures. In the search for a solution, the involvement of external actors, particularly
Russia and Ukraine, will be crucial. Russian may play a more decisive role, since it
enjoys greater leverage to pressure the parties.
Moldova entered the twenty-first century as a partly free country,61 while Trans-
dniestria remained tied to its Soviet past and quite inflexible as regards its future.
The orientation of the new government of Moldova is still unclear, but whatever
direction it chooses to go in, the  mission will be there to monitor and report.
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